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Nietzsche and the Politics of the “Nearest Things” 
 
No wanderer lived so close to his shadow as Nietzsche lived to his. His philosophy 
secures connections to the un-writable, to the opacity that accompanies the forms and words 
through which ideas come to be. Half-blind and gripped by crushing pressure inside his skull, 
Nietzsche picked his way through the Alpine landscape, alert to what his afflictions 
progressively revealed: a nethermost existence, difficult to reach but close by and with which 
communication is possible. The “air of the heights” that pervades his writing does not 
bequeath lofty abstractions of a supersensible vocation but the breath of the outside, the 
stirring of unguessed-at things.  
Philosophy as I have understood it and lived so far, is choosing to live in ice and high 
mountains – seeking out everything alien and questionable in existence, everything 
that previously has been exiled by morality. (EH, “Foreword,” 3).i  
In the winter of 1879, at the nadir of his vitality and scarcely able to see three steps ahead of 
him, Nietzsche produced The Wanderer and his Shadow, a text framed by a discussion of 
things hitherto muted and poorly perceived. At the close of this text, the shadow declares to 
the wanderer: “Of all that you have put forward, nothing has pleased me more than a promise 
you have made: You want again to become a good neighbour to the things nearest to you. 
This will benefit us poor shadows too”. The notion of the “nearest things,” introduced in this 
work as the “smallest, most everyday” concerns, seems to allude to the most obvious of 
immediacies such as eating, sleeping and dividing up the day. That such matters should claim 
philosophical attention is strongly emphasised in Nietzsche’s writings but the question of how 




Indeed, it is startling that Ecce Homo, the work in which Nietzsche announces the 
future association of his name with a “crisis as yet unprecedented on earth,” should be replete 
with recommendations pertaining to “little things” such as the benefits of drinking cocoa in 
displeasing weather or the baneful effects of German pastry on the “will to life” (EH, 
“Clever,” 1). Few writers have such skill for combining the apocalyptic with domestic advice. 
Whilst such commonplace musings might appear ancillary to the commanding themes of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy - such as grand politics, revaluation of all values, and the 
thoroughgoing critique of Christian morality – Nietzsche leaves the reader in no doubt about 
the earnestness of his pronouncements. It is the “little things” such as “nutriment, place, 
climate, recreation” – traditionally regarded as matters of indifference – which Nietzsche 
contends are “beyond all conception of greater importance than anything that has been 
considered of importance hitherto” (EH, “Clever,” 10). It is precisely here that one has to 
begin to relearn. The things that have received greatest deliberation – concepts such as God, 
soul, virtue, sin, the Beyond, truth, eternal life, are mere fancies, “strictly speaking, lies 
issuing from the bad instincts of the sick, from pernicious [schädlich] natures in the deepest 
sense” (ibid.).  
All questions of politics, the ordering of society, education have been falsified down 
to their foundations because the most harmful [schädlich] people have been taken for 
great people – because one learnt to despise the little things, which means the 
fundamental concerns of life itself. (EH, “Clever,” 10) 
Nietzsche returns to this point most urgently as Ecce Homo draws to a close, asserting that 
Christian morality teaches that matters such as nourishment, dwelling place, spiritual diet, the 
treatment of the sick, cleanliness, weather are of negligible significance compared to the 
spirit and the immortal soul (EH, “Destiny”, 8). As the question “Have I been understood?” 
echoes through the final pages with a ringing note of futility, Nietzsche declares the holy 
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pretext of “improving” humanity “a ruse to drain dry life itself” whilst the concept sin and its 
torture instrument, the concept of free will, have confused the instincts to the point at which 
“mistrust of the instincts” has become second nature (Ibid.). 
With the body having learnt to misread its own imperatives, Nietzsche makes an ardent 
appeal on behalf of the senses and all things of the shadows. In what follows, I explore what 
might be meant by the “nearest things” and how to think them politically. In the first part of 
the essay I contextualise Nietzsche’s concerns with “the closest things of all” in the “free 
spirit” period (1878-1882) and in the second I develop these insights by exploring how his 
focus on the physiological inflects a sense of the political beyond the conceptual vocabulary 
of agent-centred theory.  
 
i) The Nearest Things 
 
Nietzsche’s ailing body and his pursuit of the optimum conditions for its relief, form a 
constant chronicle in his letters to friends throughout his philosophical career. As Gregory 
Moore has shown, Nietzsche was typical of many nineteenth century intellectuals in that he 
“experimented with various dietary regimens,” read copious popular volumes of the day on 
diet, health and hygiene, freely self-medicated and enthusiastically practiced indoor 
gymnastics.ii Insights from these idiosyncratic researches find their way into Nietzsche’s 
philosophy at every turn. It would be precipitate, though, to assume that his various allusions 
to the “nearest things” in his writings constitute the philosophical study for which he urgently 
calls. In The Gay Science he acknowledges the “immense field of work” involved in 
embarking on an investigation of all that has “given colour to existence”; of generating a 
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history of the affects; of conducting research on the consequences of a regular schedule of 
work, festivals and recreation; of preparing a philosophy of nutrition; of observing how 
differently the human drives have grown and could grow depending on moral climate (GS, 
7). However, it is not simply the case that a little more labour in the laboratories of human 
culture would redress this deficit in our knowledge. Since the little things have not been 
simply overlooked but have been “despised” it is important to begin here. 
Nietzsche’s first references to the nearest things in his published work are to be found 
in the early sections of The Wanderer and his Shadow, where the idea is most fully 
developed. According to Nietzsche we have been schooled to despise “the present and 
neighbourhood and life” because we have dwelled too long in fog and gloomy weather, 
gazing languidly at worlds beyond our own (WS 16). Even the few who have dwelt in the 
“brighter fields of nature and spirit” have inherited in their blood some of this “poison of 
contempt for the nearest things” (Ibid.). In section five of the text entitled “Linguistic usage 
and reality” [Sprachgebrauch und Wirklichkeit] Nietzsche asserts that the human being needs 
to be protected against the priests and metaphysicians with their vast array of gloomy 
fictions, of souls and enduring subjects, of moral conscience, guilt and punishment. Here he 
repudiates the suggestion that it is only with reluctance that the human pampers its animal 
urges:  “For instance, we say ‘we only eat to live’—an abominable lie, like that which speaks 
of the procreation of children as the real purpose of all sexual pleasure” (WS 5). To see the 
nearest things as matters of mere biological exigency is to operate with a wholly 
impoverished model of the body, as if everything reduces to the dumb sating of a predictable 
beast. Nietzsche bemoans the fact that because the priests and improvers of mankind have 
ritualised insincerity and hypocrisy towards the everyday, things like eating, clothing and 
housing are never considered worthy of a “constant unprejudiced and universal reflection and 
reform,” (WS 5); indeed, these matters are counted as degrading and unworthy of serious 
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intellectual and artistic consideration. Only “the most serious,” farthest things, are held in 
high esteem. As a consequence, “almost all the physical and psychical frailties of the 
individual” stem from the failure to attend to the “nearest things” (WS 6). According to 
Nietzsche, continual offences against the most elementary laws of the body and spirit derive 
from being “unknowledgeable in the smallest and most everyday things” (WS 6).  
Nietzsche leaves the reader in no doubt that blunders against the most basic 
physiological laws stem from an over valorisation of the farthest things and a concomitant 
failure to give the nearest things their due. However, when we look at the examples Nietzsche 
gives of the nearest things in the opening lines of section six of The Wanderer and his 
Shadow entitled “Earthly frailty and its chief cause,” the prejudices of the priests may seem to 
have some purchase. For these examples are undeniably odd. Nietzsche remarks, almost with 
a sense of indignation, that “if we look about us, we are always coming across men who have 
eaten eggs all their lives without observing that the longest ones taste the best”; further, there 
are those who do not know that a “thunder-storm is beneficial to the stomach” or that 
“perfumes are most fragrant in cold, clear air”; that our “sense of taste varies in different 
parts of our mouths”; that “every meal at which we talk well or listen well does harm to the 
digestion” (WS 6). These latter are presented as examples of our defective powers of 
observation and, even if these specific cases do not seem to clinch the point, Nietzsche says 
that we should “concede all the more readily that everyday matters are very imperfectly seen 
and rarely observed by the majority” (WS 6).  
There are two points to be made about these very curious examples. First, Nietzsche 
appears to have deliberately selected illustrations of phenomena which are as trivial as 
possible. It is not clear how failure to notice these kinds of things could have any broader 
social significance or result in the “earthly frailty” of the title. Second, some of these 
examples are of dubious validity, if not entirely bogus. Are there really such things as long 
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eggs? And if there are, do we constantly come across egg-eaters uninitiated into the delights 
of the longer kind? If anything called for a Walter Kaufmann style footnote of the “But surely 
this is empirically false?” variety it is this. One is tempted to pass over the examples and 
move to the conclusion as Robert Miner does when he says that “the oddity of these examples 
should not be allowed to obscure the main point” which is that almost all physical and 
psychological frailties derive from this deficient power of observation.iii There is a nagging 
doubt, though, that in disregarding these specimen cases we are perpetuating the very neglect 
of the small things that is everywhere at issue; in haste to reduce the specific to the general, 
the nearest things are missed. Perhaps this is the greatest problem. When called upon to 
consider our small, seemingly inconsequential habits we call upon our habits of thinking to 
do so. 
Advancing from the particular detail to the overall conclusion is such a dominant 
impulse of thought that it is triggered almost without hesitation. A second, related, reflex is 
the impetus to reduce the strange to the familiar, to assimilate the new to existing models of 
knowledge. For example, Julian Young’s response to these unusual examples is to assert that 
“since the ‘nearest things’ pertain to diet and health, it is likely that Nietzsche is influenced, 
here, by nineteenth century German materialism (which he knew from his 1866 reading of 
Friedrich Lange’s History of Materialism”.iv Young adds that “the spirit of German 
materialism is summed up in Feuerbach’s famous remark that ‘man is what he eats’: more 
fully, ‘If you want to improve people then give them better food instead of declamations 
against sin. Man is what he eats.’” (Ibid.). Were it not for the decidedly libertine tenor of 
Nietzsche’s claims about the discerning taste buds and aesthetic sensibilities, this 
interpretation would have some force. However, whilst the link to Feuerbach seems a logical 
one at the level of generalities, Nietzsche’s examples – fine-grained differences of palate, 
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metabolism, olfactory sense – do not obviously exemplify Feuerbach’s socio-economic 
argument. 
We might readily grant that a materialist position of some kind is being advanced whilst 
being reluctant to acknowledge that the examples are frankly embarrassing. It is in a footnote 
to his commentary on this particular piece of text that Adrian del Carov  admits that Nietzsche 
“does, after all, sound rather superstitious in parts of this passage” (my emphasis). The 
comment is made in the course of condoning an error made by R. J. Hollingdale in his 
mistranslation of “Stellen des Mundes” (places in the mouth) as “phases of the moon”. The 
Cambridge University translation of section six of The Wanderer and his Shadow reads: “our 
sense of taste differs with differing phases of the moon” instead of “our sense of taste varies 
in different parts of our mouths”. In his footnote del Caro tacitly reveals what he resists 
professing in the main body of his work: that he finds the examples bizarre. In this regard, 
Hollingdale’s error is a tendentious one. The claim that the vagaries of the taste buds are 
cosmically related to the orbit of the moon is no less incredible than the assertion that 
extreme meteorological disturbance is good for the bowels. After all, Nietzsche is not averse 
to eccentric proclamations (for example, his claim to be able to read off the effects that 
climate and weather conditions have on him as if he were a “very fined calibrated and reliable 
barometer,” EH, “Clever,” 2). Indeed, Hollingdale’s mistake reveals a superior appreciation 
of the fact that Nietzsche’s examples are of a peculiarly distinctive kind. Whilst fanciful, they 
are not so fraudulent that they are self-evidently false or entirely implausible. Like something 
from Kafka or Borges, they inhabit the twilight of the reader’s credulity, provoking thought 
about what has been sensed or experienced many times but has remained un-thought.  Claims 
of this kind frustrate our drowsy assent to their putative validity. In trying to make sense of 
these examples we become stranded in a kind of unknowing. Are we remiss in failing to 
notice these particular things or in believing them to be true? What would have to be in place 
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in order for us to have faith in this kind of knowledge? When it comes to the nearest things 
we are compelled to concede how unknown to ourselves we knowers are. The great 
unknowns are not out there in the ether but are right beside us like our shadows. 
 
ii) Habits of Thought 
How do we think the nearest things politically? If we abide with Nietzsche’s examples it 
is difficult to grasp how knowledge of these trifles could ever assume the importance that 
Nietzsche claims for them. But perhaps we are looking in the wrong direction. The problem 
is that the nearest things have already been thought politically insofar as they have been 
dismissed as unworthy of our consideration and “exiled” by morality. This has far reaching 
implications for the intellectual habits which we draw on when trying to access them anew. 
How can we become good neighbours (again) to those we have exiled? 
Let us recall that The Wanderer and his Shadow 5 in which the notion of the closest or 
nearest things is first introduced is entitled “Linguistic usage and reality”. The claim is that 
faith in the “farthest things” is reinforced by a disingenuous and hyperbolic linguistic 
protocol, the consequence being that we have no means to articulate or to value the things 
that are near. Here Nietzsche is picking up on the idea of “First and Last Things” with which 
the first volume of Human all too Human opens. Metaphysical philosophy, with its 
fundamental faith in antithetical values, denies that something could originate in its opposite 
(HH, 1). Supported by the transcendental presupposition that binary opposition is a logical 
constraint of thought, the “ultimate things” are said to have a wholly other origin from those 
base, material things: they claim a “miraculous source” in the very kernel of being. Rejecting 
these customary exaggerations of language, Nietzsche declares that there are no antitheses, 
only “sublimations” or deviations from a “basic element” [Grundelement]; that the most 
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highly prized ideas and glorious things have inglorious origins in the “most despised 
materials,” that fine things are forged in the filthy crucible of matter (HH, 1). By definition, 
abstract ideas are absolutely other to the base materiality that they abject but the difference 
between the two is non-reciprocal. As Nietzsche establishes in “On Truth and Lies in a Non-
moral Sense,” the concept of identity, indeed concept formation as such, is achieved by 
denying both intrinsic continuity with matter and gradations of difference (his example being 
the countless non-identical leaves reduced to equivalence by the concept “leaf”). As 
distributed capacities immanent to the flows of matter the nearest things are peculiarly 
resistant to specification by concepts. At the level of “linguistic usage,” their reality 
disappears. 
From the perspective of Platonic-Christian values, the “nearest”  and “farthest things”  are 
fundamentally different in kind, the latter having been prized as ideal forms, ungrounded in 
matter and wholly distinct from active processes of materialization. Because these realms 
have been regarded as mutually discontinuous, the world is perceived as a mass of isolated 
beings, unitary souls and brute material forms with no fluency between them. If the reason 
we fail to think the nearest things is that we approach them in terms of the farthest things –
concepts, truth, grand narratives of knowledge of reason or science – then ignorance in 
physiological matters will not be swiftly corrected by knowledge. Nietzsche’s strange 
examples in section six of The Wanderer and his Shadow are about very fine gradations of 
difference and subtleties of sense that elude both common experience and the conventional 
aesthetic and physiological registers in which we aim to “make sense” of them. To try and 
apprehend sensations or experiences in these terms is to arrest them, to imprison them in 
habits of thought and language which confiscate their powers.  
If we have been looking in the wrong direction when trying to understand the nearest 
things, where should we turn? Nietzsche gives few clues in the scattered references in his 
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“free spirit” writings but in a note from summer 1879, there is a suggestion that a more 
sustained discussion of the idea as a doctrine was envisaged (KSA, 8, 40[16]). Under the 
projected title “The Doctrine of the Nearest Things” Nietzsche offers a list of familiar items: 
“the division of the day [..],vi food, company, nature, solitude, sleep, employment, education 
(original and foreign)”, the intriguing “use of mood and atmospheric conditions,” and at the 
close of the list “retreat from politics”. The phrase Zurückgezogenheit von der Politik – 
privacy from/ withdrawal from politics is jarring. It seems more counsel than category, a 
stance to be taken rather than a behaviour to be explored, and one wonders why the doctrine 
of the nearest things might include this instruction.   
Of course, as scholars of classics will recognise, the dictum “retreat from politics” has a 
distinctly Epicurean resonance; in fact, the injunction “We must release ourselves from the 
prison of affairs and politics” is one of the best known Vatican sayings of the ancient Greek 
philosopher (LVIII).vii During the period spanning Human all too Human to The Gay 
Science, Epicurus appears on the periphery of Nietzsche’s philosophy, a shadow presence to 
his wanderings, a “wisdom that walks in bodily form” (AOM 224). Whilst at no point does 
Nietzsche explicitly identify Epicurus as an inspiration for the philosophy of the nearest 
things, the connections are everywhere implicit.viii For example, the two sections of The 
Wanderer and his Shadow (WS 5 & 6) which introduce the doctrine of the nearest things are 
directly succeeded by a lengthy passage on the consolations of Epicurean teaching. The 
“wonderful insight” which Nietzsche attributes to Epicurus is the realisation that to quell the 
tempests of the soul “it is absolutely not necessary to have resolved the ultimate and 
outermost theoretical questions” (WS 7). Faith in the notion of ultimate truth is undermined 
by Epicurus’s embrace of a “multiplicity of hypotheses” and by his insistence on the gods’ 
disregard for the affairs of mortals (WS 7).ix At odds with the orthodoxies of transcendent 
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thinking, Epicurus’s rejection of the public political life of the Athenian statesman is a move 
in a different political direction, a return to the nearest things. 
Indeed, the great lesson of Epicurus is to start outside, to be beyond the polis, to be 
relieved of citizenship, to “live unknown”. Away from the Academy and the Lyceum, both of 
which were subject to the scrutiny of the city, the Epicurean Garden was a place in which 
disciples became attuned to the rhythms of the natural world. Gardening activity was not 
merely an education in the cycles of nature, but for the disciples who cultivated the fruit and 
vegetables that were grown there, it was an immersion in the elemental: “Here, in the 
convergence of vital forces in the garden’s microcosm, the cosmos manifested its greatest 
harmonies; here the human soul rediscovered its essential connection to matter”.x For Robert 
Harrison, the most important political principle that tending the Epicurean garden yielded 
was that life in all its variations “is intrinsically mortal” and that “the human soul shares the 
fate of whatever grows and perishes on and in the earth”.xi  For Nietzsche, as for Epicurus, 
the “nearest things” are flows, forces and drives: paths between realms that the Platonic-
Christian worldview characterises as essentially separate.  
Nietzsche’s excitement with Epicurus at this period in his writing is bound up with the 
latter’s pursuit of philosophy as a counter-force to the dominant metaphysical tradition. His 
imperative is to withdraw from the state and its politicians – the priests and “improvers of 
mankind” whom Nietzsche insists “lie like a burden on society” (WS 5). At stake politically 
is a contestation of the sensible; it is a question of what counts as political, especially at the 
level of non-human material force.xii The fundamental crime of Christian morality has been to 
breed an animal with instincts to mistrust its instincts. Its “second nature” is the negation of 
its primary nature. To think the nearest things we need to begin elsewhere, to take the body 
and physiology as our starting point. Tempting though it might be to perceive the body as a 
cipher for the self, with the nearest things as a map of its essential coordinates, this 
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cartography of the body is still conditioned by Platonic- Christian values. The “resolution” to 
our alienation from the nearest things must be that we become more estranged from our 
coherent sense of self. In articulating his politics of the body, Nietzsche departs from the 
vocabulary of individual agency and emphasizes the inestimable value of non-knowledge.  In 
a well-known note in The Will to Power, he describes “the nature of our subject-unity” in 
terms of “regents at the head of a communality,” going on to identify the dependence of these 
regents upon the ruled, and also “an order of rank and division of labour as the conditions that 
make possible the whole and its parts” (WP 492). Although the ruler and the subordinates are 
“of the same kind”,” it is often necessary for the regent to be kept in considerable ignorance 
concerning individual activities and disturbances within the communality. Moreover, this 
lack of knowledge might be of inestimable value. As Nietzsche puts it, “it could be useful and 
important for one’s activity to interpret oneself falsely”: 
This is why we question the body and reject the evidence of the sharpened senses 
[verschärften Sinne]; we try, if you like, to see whether the inferior parts 
[Untergebenen] themselves cannot enter into communication with us. (WP 492)  
The body with its sharpened senses is a polis ruled by despotic consciousness: self-
aware but only of its own borders. Following Epicurus, Nietzsche moves away from the body 
politic to the outside. His “body” is not a walled city like the Platonic republic. Previously 
muffled by linguistic custom and cultural convention, the “inferior,” unknown body is now 
exposed in an uncanny silence.  
The human body [is that] on which the entire most distant and nearest [nächste] past 
of all organic becoming becomes alive and bodily again, through which, above and 
beyond which, an immense inaudible stream seems to flow. (WP 659) 
13 
 
This is a body released from the grip of the coherent, self-regarding senses into the 
transpersonal silt of multiple flows. Beneath the foam and wrack of so many ego impulses 
and moral imperatives washing against its shores, there is a quiet history yet to be explored.  
When Nietzsche asks in The Wanderer and his Shadow 6 about small things that have 
been felt or encountered many times, the examples may seem trivial but his concern is with 
the habits and behaviours that we have pursued unthinkingly. In pursuit of a sensory 
landscape beyond the confines of the Platonic body-politic, Nietzsche declares in Ecce Homo 
that it is on account of his fluctuating health that he develops a refinement of perception 
which an otherwise sound constitution would never have afforded (EH, “Wise,” 1). 
Elaborating further, he claims that illness grants him the energy to achieve “absolute isolation 
and release from routine circumstances” (EH, “Wise,” 2): “it was as if I discovered life anew, 
myself included; I tasted all good things, even the small ones, as no other could easily taste 
them” (Ibid.). By taking the body as a guiding direction for thinking, Nietzsche turn his “will 
to health,” to life, into his philosophy (Ibid.). Attuned to the promptings of the nearest things 
Nietzsche gathers together instinctively from all he sees, hears, experiences; he becomes a 
“selective principle” [auswählendes Princip], he lets a great deal go (Ibid.). 
In Ecce Homo Nietzsche makes it clear that “becoming what one is” does not involve 
an active project on the part of the one who becomes. It is at best an agency of aversion. 
Similarly, relearning is not about greater knowledge. Nietzsche’s recommendations for 
examining the little things are not to be taken as stipulations for particular diets or climates. 
He notes that everyone has his or her own measure, “often between the most narrow and the 
most delicate limits” (EH, “Clever”, 1). The key point is summed up in a tantalizing fragment 
in Nietzsche’s notebook M III 1 (dated Spring-Autumn 1881) thus: 
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All habitualization [Gewöhnungen] (e.g. to specific foods, like coffee, or specific 
divisions of time [Zeiteintheilung] leads, in the long term, to the breeding of a 
particular kind of human. Therefore, take a look at yourself! Examine the smallest of 
things! Where do they tend? Do they belong to your kind, to your goal? 
[9/525/11[212]) 
This habitualization occurs in relation to thought too, for example, a “habitualization to a 
certain causal interpretation which in truth obstructs and even prohibits an investigation of 
the cause” (TI, Four Errors,” 4). In political terms, it is these ingrained habits which 
Nietzsche’s rethinking of the physiological serves to disperse. Material forces do not simply 
influence thought; ideas materialize as physical effects. It is through the forces of habit – of 
time and the body – that a particular kind of human comes to be. 
Notebook M III 1 in which these reflections on habitualization occur is a text replete 
with reflections on time and the body, particularly in relation to the thought of the eternal 
return – the momentous “revelation” of this period (Autumn 1881). It is also a surprising, 
lesser-known locus for the doctrine of the nearest things; in fact the two doctrines seem to be 
subtly related. In M III 1 Nietzsche integrates the idea that ideas are material forces into a 
draft for the most well-known section of The Gay Science: the moment in which the idea of 
the eternal return is first announced by a “demon”. To the anticipated question “But if 
everything is necessary, how can I be in charge of my own actions?” Nietzsche gives the 
following response: “You say that food, place, air, society shape and determine you? Well, 
your opinions do still more for these determine you to this food, place, air, society” 
(KSA,9,11[143]).  It is your habits that isolate precisely these things as determinants. Formed 
within a “culture”, like cells in solution, perceptions and beliefs have a shaping power on 
how the nearest things are experienced. For Nietzsche, everything hinges on being able to 
make the eternal return such a determining power: “if you incorporate [einverleibst] the 
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thought of thoughts it will change you”: “you” will come to embody the thought, or rather, 
the eternal return will embody you. It will become a new habit of thought.   
When Nietzsche crafts the famous section 341 of The Gay Science, “The Greatest 
heavyweight,” these more explicit references to the nearest things fall away. Nevertheless, an 
echo can still be heard in the words “everything unspeakably small and great in your life must 
return to you” (my emphasis). In notebook M III 1 in an extended note entitled “the eternal 
return of the same” Nietzsche identifies the thought as a new point of gravity and 
acknowledges “the infinite importance of our knowledge, our errors, our habits and ways of 
life for all that is to come” (KSA 9/11[141]). Nietzsche questions what we will do with the 
remainder of our lives, having lived for the greatest part in essential unknowing. He declares 
that “We shall teach the teaching”; this will prove the strongest means of “incorporating” it 
(Ibid.).   
 The body is physically changed by thought. If we persist in hearing this claim 
metaphorically we defer to the autonomy of the intellect and the illusion of a true and 
apparent world. Perhaps our most lethal habit of embodied thought is the thanatological 
addiction to nouns. It requires huge effort to think concepts like eternity or infinity as a 
plurality of forces. We habitually perform the reverse alchemy of considering these concepts 
as things, then “a” thing, then “the one”. The key, as Notebook M III 1, intimates, is to go to 
the root of our habits: 
How can one give meaning to the nearest smallest most fleeting things? A) By grasping 
them as the root of habits. B) By grasping them as eternal and as likewise conditioning 
the eternal. (KSA, 9, 11[167]. 
Eternity is almost universally figured as unconditioned and unconditional but such a sterile 
conception excludes everything that becomes. Things flicker into being, blossom, mature and 
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decay – and this is the priestly objection to them – but the idea that eternity might be born 
from these despised nearest things, that eternity might be created, constantly recreated and 
conditioned by these lowly things, is a world changing idea. The eternal is something which 
is formed by difference, by the ongoing interplay of forces productive of all becoming. As 
such, the nearest things are gateways of the moment, the means by which one becomes what 
one is. As Nietzsche comments in a note collected in The Will to Power: “We have 
discovered the “smallest world” as that which is decisive everywhere” (WP 1016). 
To think the nearest things requires a liberation of the body from its exile by morality, 
it requires a physiology transfigured by eternal return: “In the actual world, in which 
everything is bound to and conditioned by everything else, to condemn and think away 
anything means to condemn and think away everything” (WP 584). Produced by innumerable 
processes – biological, social meteorological – the human animal is a holding pattern of on-
going, eternally renewing forces. To attend to the smallest things, it is imperative to resist 
much, to withdraw from the cultural norms of reasoning and perceiving that have been 
hitherto incorporated. In surrendering habits of all kinds, either through sickness or through 
experiments with health, it is possible to access new sensuous continents of experience, to 
return to things anew. 
We recall the shadow’s words to the wanderer: “Of all that you have said nothing has 
pleased me more than a promise you have made: You want again to become a good 
neighbour to the things nearest to you. This will benefit us poor shadows too” (my emphasis). 
Taking “a step further in convalescence,” the “free spirit” in Nietzsche’s 1886 Preface to 
Human all too Human, professes gratitude for his expeditions: “He looks thankfully back, 
grateful to his wandering, to his hardness and self-alienation” in the icy heights (HH Preface, 
5). Slowly returning to health, he is full of wonder: “Where had he been? These near and 
nearest things: how changed they seem! What bloom and magic they have acquired in the 
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meantime!  [..] He had been beside himself [ausser sich] no doubt of that” (ibid.). Beyond the 
citadel of the self, Nietzsche had returned anew to the nethermost and the close. In the 
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Matter, p.123, n). Her work on the “active powers issuing from non-subjects” (p.ix) might be regarded as a 
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